AN ARTICLE FOR 7KBW’S COMMERCIAL DISPUTES NEWSLETTER By James Goudkamp
The defence generally
The law governing the doctrine of illegality has undergone significant development over the course of the last few decades. The courts have been primarily concerned with the common law version of the defence. That defence had been governed by the so-called reliance test derived from Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340. According to that test, the defence applied if the claimant, in order to establish his or her cause of action, needed to rely on his or her own wrongdoing. However, in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42; [2017] AC 467 the Supreme Court rejected that rule-based test in favour of a policy-based rule. Pursuant to the new approach, the applicability of the illegality defence depends on whether or not the balance of relevant policy factors favours denying the claim by reason of the claimant’s illegality: see further James Goudkamp, ‘The End of an Era? Illegality in Private Law in the Supreme Court’ (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 14.
In Energizer Supermarket Ltd v Holiday Snacks Ltd [2022] UKPC 16; [2023] 2 P & CR 9, which concerned an appeal from Trinidad and Tobago, the Privy Council confirmed that the common law version of the illegality defence has a statutory sibling. The statutory form of the defence will preclude a claim from succeeding where the statute that the claimant infringed itself provides, explicitly or implicitly, that the claimant should forgo his or her private law rights in issue.
In Hawkins v Abarbanel Limited [2025] UKPC 58, the Privy Council again examined the statutory form of the defence on an appeal from the Cayman Islands. It is with Hawkins that this comment is concerned.
The facts
Mr Rogelio Hawkins had borrowed money, US$407,000 in total, from a company known as Abarbanel Limited (“Abarbanel”). Abarbanel was registered in the Cayman Islands but was ultimately owned and controlled by two US citizens. The loans were secured by charges upon two of Mr Hawkins’ properties, one of which was his home. The interest charged, which was calculated daily and compounded, was at extremely high rate. It was at 16% per annum for the first year and thereafter at 15.27% above the 10-year “constant maturity rate” on US Treasury securities. The rate increased to 18% per annum if the account fell into arrears.
In the event, Mr Hawkins defaulted on his repayment obligations. Abarbanel claimed that US$875,000 was due and gave notice of its intention to enforce its security. In response Mr Hawkins issued a claim for a declaration that the loan contract and interest charges were illegal, void and unenforceable and that no interest was payable. He also sought an order discharging the charges upon his properties. The claim relied on the fact that Abarbanel was not licenced to carry on money-lending activities. During the course of the proceedings, Mr Hawkins repaid the principal sum, although he refused to pay the compound interest, which amounted to US$763,000.
The Privy Council’s decision
Having been unsuccessful in the courts below, Mr Hawkins appealed to the Privy Council. Before the Privy Council, it was common ground that Abarbanel had committed two strict liability offences contrary to the Local Companies (Control) Act (2007 Revision) (“the LCCA”) and the Trade and Business Licensing Act (2007 Revision) (“the TBLA”) by virtue of its having lent money without a licence. However, section 23 of the LCAA provided that “For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no business transaction shall be void or voidable by reason only that, at the relevant time, any party thereto is in breach of this Law”. Conversely, no such provision featured in the TBLA.
Lord Burrows, delivering the advice of the board, said at [22] that “[w]here the relevant illegality is laid down in a statute, the essential question in relation to a contract formed, or performed, in breach of the statute, is whether the statute has dealt with the effects of the illegality on the enforceability of the contract”. That question was said to be one “of ordinary statutory interpretation”.
Lord Burrows found “that the purpose of the LCCA is not to render contracts made by unlicensed businesses unenforceable. … Rather the purpose of the LCCA is to ‘screen’ …, and to ensure a measure of control over, foreign companies carrying on business in the Cayman Islands so as to protect and promote Cayman-controlled companies” (at [29]). The purpose, he said, of “the TBLA is not to render contracts made by unlicensed businesses unenforceable … [but] to raise revenue by requiring payment for a licence” (at [32]).
In these circumstances, Lord Burrows concluded that neither statute impliedly prohibited an unlicensed company from contracting (at [34]). He considered that that position was made express in the case of the LCCA by section 23 (at [43]). That was so despite the fact that section 23 used the language of “void” and “voidable” but not “unenforceable”. Although a conceptual distinction could be drawn between those concepts, it would be absurd, Lord Burrows observed, to suppose that the legislature intended to make a contract that had been formed in breach of the licensing provisions unenforceable given that it had stipulated that such a contract was neither void nor voidable. The result was that the Privy Council dismissed Mr Hawkins’ appeal.
Notably, Hawkins dealt with the relationship between the two forms of the illegality defence. It appears that they are mutually exclusive. If the legislature by the criminal law statute concerned has expressly or impliedly specified the civil law consequences of the claimant’s wrongdoing, the common law version of the defence is seemingly left with no role to play. As Lord Burrows put it at [44], “where statute has dealt with the effects of the illegality the courts must apply the statute and the common law is ousted”. Had, however, the Patel policy-based test applied, Lord Burrows said it would have produced the same result as the statutory illegality defence.
Conclusion
Statutes that create offences rarely specify the civil law consequences of committing them. The legislation in issue in Hawkins (and, more specifically, in the LCCA) is an exception to this pattern. As such, the statutory illegality defence will only be in issue infrequently, and it seems that it will continue to be overshadowed by its common law counterpart. Where, however, the statutory variant of the illegality defence is in play, its application will turn, as Hawkins makes clear, upon a careful search for the legislature’s intention.
Click here for a copy of the judgment: Hawkins v Abarbanel Limited [2025] UKPC 58; [2026] 1 WLR 115
